To: Roy Cooper, NC Attorney General
NC Office of the Attorney General
North Carolina Department of Justice
P.O. Box 629
Raleigh, NC 27602-0629

CERTIFIED MAIL: __________________________________________

Cc:

Dear Mr. Cooper,

We are writing to you, our Governor, State Senator, and Representatives because it is our belief that our elected officials can and will remedy a wrong–if given a fair opportunity–without the need for involving outside party(s) or entity(s). We have included others that have shown an interest in the subject matter to be discussed. Being that it is the Insurance Commissioner's policy that is the subject of this challenge, he was included as a courtesy.

The North Carolina Commissioner of Insurance (Commissioner) has provided that North Carolina manufactured home purchasers only have the right to be heard by his Department on 'Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards' (MHCSS) related problems, for a maximum of 12-months from the date of delivery of their home. [See Exhibit A–"Complaint Form", as issued by the NC Department of Insurance].

The Insurance Commissioner's rule or policy unquestionably deprives North Carolina's Citizens of their due process rights under the MHCSS Act.

North Carolina Statute Article 9B & The MHCSS Act

North Carolina Article 9B §143-146 states: "This Article provides to the Commissioner all necessary authority to enable the State to obtain approval as a State Administrative Agency under the provisions of the Act." The "Act" is defined in Article 9B as the MHCSS Act of 1974.

Several parts of Article 9B that follow this "Statement of Policy" directly and substantially conflict with the MHCSS Act. So substantial are some conflicts that it would be true if the State statute were given precedence over the Federal Statute, the Federal Statute would stand amended by the State Statute. It will be assumed that it was not the State of North Carolina's intent to substantially impede or impair the full purposes and intent of the U.S. Congress. Given this to be true, then no one should disagree that the State statute must stand down whenever such conflicts are encountered. For this reason, only the Federal Statute need be cited throughout this discussion.

Even though no such limitation as the one prescribed by the Commissioner is expressed, or otherwise implied by the MHCSS Act, the Commissioner has nevertheless, contrived a rule or policy that surreptitiously shortens the Statute of Limitations provided by the MHCSS Act.

There is only one relevant event or occurrence that can terminate the efficacy of the MHCSS Act; and this is for the 'first purchaser' [endnote¹] of the 'manufacturer's manufactured home'[endnote²] to sale, or offer for sale, their manufactured home to another person [endnote³].

In accordance with the MHCSS Act, it is prohibited "to manufacture for sale, lease, sell, offer for sale or lease...any manufactured home, which is manufactured on or after the effective date of any applicable Federal MHCSS under this chapter and which does not comply with such standard" [endnote⁴]. This violation represents the 'primary violation' under the MHCSS Act.

Where a statute affords a remedy, there is a "primary right" [endnote⁵ & endnote⁶]. The prohibition cited above as well declares the "primary right" (emphasis added) of the 'first purchaser' of the manufacturer's manufactured home'. The 'first purchaser' has the legal right to a manufactured home that complies with all applicable MHCSS at the completion of the sale of the 'manufacturer's manufactured home'. Simply stated, it is against Federal Law to manufacture for sale, lease, sell, offer for sale or lease (emphasis added) any other kind of manufactured home to any 'first purchaser'.

Saying that a 'primary violation' has not or did not occur; then it can also be said that the deterrents prescribed to restrain and/or penalize the 'primary violation' of any person(s) have no force and effect.

Under the MHCSS Act, the accomplishment of the primary objective is signified by the Manufacturer certifying [endnote⁷] that he or she exercised due care in assuring the 'first purchaser' was afforded their "primary right" to a manufactured home that complied with all applicable MHCSS [endnote⁴ & endnote⁸].

Unless those responsible for enforcing the MHCSS (enforcement jurisdiction) have information or knowledge that indicates that the manufacturer's certification (emphasis added) may be false or misleading in a material respect [endnote⁸], it must be assumed that a 'primary violation(s)' has not occurred.

If there were no means for obtaining such information or knowledge or an obstacle was erected to impede or block the conveyance of such information or knowledge to the 'enforcement jurisdiction' (emphasis added), then for all practical purposes, upon the manufacturer's certification (emphasis added) of compliance, the Statute would cease to have efficacy.

[Parte quacumque integrante sublata, tollitur totum – When any essential part has been removed, the whole is removed (or destroyed)].

It is a reasonable conclusion that only the possessor or 'first purchaser' of said merchandise would have a bona fide financial interest in the continuing durability, quality, and safety of their purchase. As clearly implied in exhibit A, the 'first purchaser' is possession of this merchandise.

It is also reasonable to conclude that once such merchandise has been delivered to the 'first purchaser', and the manufacturer or any agent thereof, have received payment, that the manufacturer and/or his or her agent(s) have a significant financial interest in protecting the sum total of the proceeds of their sale. It would simply not be in the manufacturers, or his or her agent(s), best financial interest to volunteer information or knowledge to the 'enforcement jurisdiction' regarding their violation(s) of the MHCSS Act. This would be especially true if the consequence for not conveying in good faith [endnote⁹endnote & endnote¹⁰], such information or knowledge, has been surreptitiously precluded by another action. Any claim to the contrary would be unquestionably capricious.

As for the notion that the manufacturers would convey information or knowledge to the 'enforcement jurisdiction', regarding the 'primary violation(s)' of another manufacturer or their agents, this is as well capricious.

It would simply not be in the manufacturer's and/or their agents best financial interest to seek out other manufacturer's purchasers and conduct inspections on their manufactured homes in an effort to discover the 'primary violation(s)' of another manufacturer, or any agents thereof, and then to report these 'primary violation(s)' to the 'enforcement jurisdiction'. Without any doubt, the manufacturers on the receiving end of this kindness would find themselves compelled to reciprocate the kindness.

While this game of tit-for-tat would most likely benefit the consumers of this merchandise, it would not be in the best financial interest of the manufacturers of this merchandise and/or any agent(s) thereof; to engage is such a game.

From any perspective, it is simply not in the manufacturers or his or her agent(s) best financial interest for information or knowledge to be conveyed to the 'enforcement jurisdiction', which may bring to light their 'primary violation(s)'.

On the other hand, the purchaser would reliably convey such information to the 'enforcement jurisdiction' since it would be in their best financial interest for the 'enforcement jurisdiction' to address the manufacturer's and/or their agents, violation(s) of the MHCSS.

It could be argued that the particular limitation being discussed herein only applies to the 'first purchaser's' right to file a complaint, and that the State is free to inspect, investigate, or enforce indefinitely. Such an argument would be intended to deceive.

The 'enforcement jurisdiction's' policy or rule of discarding or disregarding any information or knowledge conveyed to it by the 'first purchaser', once 12 months have passed from the date of delivery, unquestionably represents hears no evil, sees no evil. Given this, it would be a contradiction of the 'enforcement jurisdiction's' policy or rule to go obliviously gallivanting across the countryside in search of evil. There is simply no cognizant rationale for such a claim when the objective of the policy or rule is clearly hears no evil, sees no evil.

Article 9B § 143-143.10 states that the Commissioner and/or the Manufactured Housing Board (MHB) have only the authority "to receive and resolve complaints from buyers of manufactured homes and from persons in the manufactured housing industry".

As already discussed, the only one of these two groups that has a bona fide interest in conveying information or knowledge to the 'enforcement jurisdiction' regarding any 'primary violation(s)', would be the 'first purchasers' of this merchandise, and not the manufacturers [endnote¹¹] and sellers [endnote¹²] of this merchandise.

Such information or knowledge would be paramount (emphasis added) before the 'enforcement jurisdiction' would have cause to initiate any inspection or investigation for determining whether the manufacturer of the merchandise, or his or her agents, have committed a 'primary violation'.

The N.C. Assembly has silenced the public's voice, although this was most likely not their intent. The voice of the 'first purchaser' is purposefully silenced by the 'enforcement jurisdiction'12-months after the delivery of the manufacturer's merchandise. The 'enforcement jurisdiction's' policy unquestionably represents hears no evil, sees no evil, therefore, they will not seek out evil. The manufacturer and/or his or her agents have nothing to gain and much to lose financially if any information or knowledge comes to light, which may give reason to awaken §5414 (the purchaser's remedial right) and/or §5410 (prescribed penalties) of the MHCSS Act.

By any rationale, the Commissioner's policy or rule represents a quasi Statute of Limitations (emphasis added) that ends the efficacy of the MHCSS Act 12-months after the Manufacturer's manufactured home is delivered to the first purchaser.

Article 9B §143-151.4. Notification of defects and correction procedures. Every manufacturer of manufactured homes shall provide for notification and correction procedures in any manufactured home produced by the manufacturer in accordance with the Act, this Article, and any rules adopted by the Commissioner.

The "Act" referenced in §143-151.4 is of course the National MHCSS Act. The Section of the "Act" that addresses "notification and correction" procedures is section 615 (42 USC §5414). In regards to notification and correction, Mr. William Matchneer III, HUD's DFO for Manufactured Housing recently stated the following on the record:

"Further …the Act sets no time limits for a manufacturer’s responsibilities under Section 615. Section 615 clearly contemplates enforcement authority over latent defects in a home design or construction that the consumer would not have knowledge of unless notified or until his or her safety is compromised. The proposal would limit a manufacturer s responsibility to act until after a consumer complains, whereas the Act places affirmative notification and correction requirements on manufacturers for defects as a protective measure even if an affected consumer has not yet complained. Further, the proposal would limit the responsibility of manufacturers and retailers to those defects that are discovered five years from the date of the first sale, though, as mentioned above, Section 615 sets no such limits."

The proposal being discussed above was largely crafted by the "Oregon Manufactured Housing Association" and promulgated to the Manufactured Housing Consensus Committee by way of the Oregon State Manufactured Housing Director. This proposal bears a remarkable resemblance to the Insurance Commissioner's rule or policy being discussed herein. It is evident that such a rule or policy clearly has no statutory support under the MHCSS Act.

The N.C. Commissioner of Insurance has promulgated a policy or rule that substantially impairs or impedes the full purpose and intent of the United States Congress and therefore, the Commissioners policy or rule, and any State Statute produced to give credence to such a policy or rule, would unquestionably have to stand down to the Federal Statute.

While the Governor, North Carolina Assembly, and/or Attorney General may ultimately choose to ignore the fact that the Insurance Commission and/or the MHB precluded Constitutional Due Process by promulgating a policy or rule that effectively amends the full purpose and intent of the U.S. Congress, it is unlikely that others would be as willing to ignore this fact if they were asked to render judgment in this regards.

The State of North Carolina states in its, "Regulations for Manufactured Homes", 2003 Edition, Appendix M, the "North Carolina State plan", as approved by the Secretary of Housing on January 18, 2001, that:

SP.1— "The North Carolina Department of Insurance, Manufactured Building Division, hereinafter known as the State Administrative Agency, will handle consumer complaints concerning standards-related problems in manufactured homes."

As previously discussed, without such information or knowledge, which is essential before the Department would have cause to "initiate any appropriate action or proceeding to prevent, restrain, or correct any violation of the Act, this Article, or any rules adopted under this Article", the Department has no cause or reason for taking any such action.

In the light of HUD's written policy position regarding §615 of the Act, the Department's rule or policy discussed herein, is contrary to the State's own plan (SP.1) as submitted to, and approved by the Secretary of Housing.

With this, it is clear that the State of N.C., by rejecting or refusing to accept complaints from 'first purchasers', which may arise 12-months after the delivery of the manufacturer's merchandise to the 'first purchaser', is not honoring its commitment or agreement to "handle consumer complaints concerning standards-related problems in manufactured homes".

The N.C. Warranty provision in §143-143.16 of Article 9B, requires the manufacturer and/or his or her agents, to warranty those aspects of the home's design and construction, which are covered by the MHCSS (See Appendix A–pages 16 - 18–summary of 24 CFR Part 3280–"The Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards"). The MHCSS Act states in 42 USC §5403(d) that:

"Whenever a Federal manufactured home construction and safety standard established under this chapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any manufactured home covered, any standard regarding the construction or safety applicable to the same aspect of performance of such manufactured home which is not identical to the Federal manufactured home construction and safety standard."

(Note: The underline and bold text were added herein for emphasis, however, no such emphasis appears in §5403(d) of the MHCSS Act)

Section 143-143.16 (1) of N.C. Article 9A states: The manufacturer warrants that all structural elements, plumbing systems, heating, cooling and fuel burning systems, electrical systems, and any other components included by the manufacturer are free...from defects [endnote¹³].

24 CFR 3280.1 of the MHCSS states: this standard covers all equipment and installations in the design, construction, transportation, fire safety, plumbing, heat-producing and electrical systems of manufactured homes, which are designed to be used as dwelling units.

Referencing Appendix A, it can be seen even by a person unfamiliar with the intricacies of a building code, that the MHCSS extensively covers every conceivable aspect, including "all structural elements, plumbing systems, heating, cooling and fuel burning systems, electrical systems, and any other components".

Given this fact, it would be highly improbable that the Department could address a warranty issue related to "structural elements, plumbing systems, heating, cooling and fuel burning systems, electrical systems, and any other components", and not be addressing a construction or safety defect(s) applicable to some aspect of performance covered by the MHCSS or a failure of the manufactured home to comply with the MHCSS. (Emphasis Added)

Given this fact, the State of North Carolina can only enforce its "Manufacturer Warranty" (performance promise) provision to the extent that it does not in any respect; surreptitiously require a new manufactured home to meet a higher construction or safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance, for which a MHCSS is in effect.

Knowing this is true; it is also true that the State of North Carolina has no legal standing to enforce its warranty provision unless such manufactured home is known not to comply with all applicable MHCSS (emphasis added).

If the commissioner will not or avoids making such a determination, then by any rationale, the manufacturer's compliance with the State's warranty provision is strictly voluntary. The appearance that the manufacturer's warranty can be enforced by the State can have no purpose other than to misdirect people away from that which is truly enforceable under both State (Article 9B) and Federal (42 USC, Chapter 70) law –the "manufacturer's certification" that the manufacturer's manufactured home will perform in a manner that "ensures durable, livable, and safe housing" [24 CFR 3280.303 (b)] to the first purchaser.

Simply stated, the manufacturer's certification of compliance with all applicable MHCSS trumps the manufacturer's warranty (emphasis added), and this is regardless of whatever parchment facades are erected by any State, to make it appear otherwise. Of course, a finding of noncompliance with the MHCSS by the Department would give cause for awakening the remedy and penalty provisions of the MHCSS Act. It is apparent that the Commissioner's policy or rule discussed herein is to assure that this occurrence is avoided, regardless of any unwarranted injury incurred by N.C. manufactured home purchasers.

The Commissioner's policy or rule can have no plausible objective beyond shielding the manufacturers and/or his or her agent(s) from their accountability for their violations of the MHCSS Act. No court has found that such a policy or rule represents a legitimate governmental objective since it is contrary to the reason of "Law".

The Commissioner's rule or policy herein, by its arbitrary and capricious nature, unquestionably compels the violation of the purchaser's right to due process.

Title 42, Chapter 70, §5421 provides the rights afforded manufactured home purchasers under this chapter may not be waived, and any provision of a contract or agreement entered into after August 22, 1974, to the contrary shall be void.

The first part of §5421 establishes that manufactured home purchasers are a "protected class". As a protected class, the Federal, nor State(s), government may take any action that impedes, impairs, or revokes the rights bestowed to this class by the U.S. Congress. The only exception to this would be if the U.S. Congress, in accordance with the Articles of the Constitution, amended or repealed such rights.

The second part addresses action by private persons. No private person(s), including the purchaser and the manufacturer or any agent thereof, may enter into any agreement, which contains any provision that waives the rights of the first purchaser under Title 42, Chapter 70.

[Pacto aliquid licitum est quod sine pacto non admittitur – By agreement (or contract) something is permitted that, without agreement, is not allowed, but not in violation of public law.] ‘Coke. Part 1 of the Commentarie upon Littleton 166’.

Any law promulgated by the N.C. Assembly and/or any policy or rule promulgated by the N.C. Insurance Commissioner and/or the MHB that impedes, impairs, or revokes the rights of the purchasers of manufactured homes under the MHCSS Act, must give way to the federal statute (emphasis added).

While it may be true that the MHCSS Act lies dormant after the manufacturer's certification of compliance with all applicable MHCSS, this cannot represent the termination of the efficacy of this Statute, for if it did, it would preclude 42 USC §5409(b)(1), and would allow the law's efficacy to be terminated by a fraud. In the case of fraud, there would be no way to hold the perpetrator accountable since the law's efficacy was precluded by the perpetrator's fraud. Within all reason, such a Law would be arbitrary and capricious.

North Carolina Statute Article 9A

In regards to the Manufactured Housing Board, North Carolina Statute 9A provides the following:

1. Only the two general public members are precluded from having a significant financial interest in the manufactured housing industry (Conflict of Interest).
2. The North Carolina statute provides such Board with the authority to promulgate public policy for the State enforcement of federal law.
3. There are no provisions indented to curtail or inhibit self-dealing by industry members and other members of the board.
4. This board is empowered by the statute to determine if a violation of the National MHCSS Act has occurred and whether a purchaser is entitled to timely and equitable remedy under the Federal statute

It should be no surprise (emphasis added) to anyone that such a Board that wields this much power would be a party to promulgating a policy that clearly has the objective of shielding the manufacturers, or any agents thereof, from their accountability for their violation(s) of the MHCSS, and in almost all cases, countless years before the time prescribed by the MHCSS Act.

North Carolina sought and gained approval from the U.S. Secretary of Housing to enforce the National Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards. This STATE Board is promulgating public policy and making enforcement decisions towards this end. Given this fact, there is no doubt that North Carolina, as a State approved by HUD to promulgate and enforce the MHCSS, receives Federal dollars from the United States Department of HUD (emphasis added).

However, the USCMH provides no statutory direction or explanation for how these Federal dollars are distributed or utilized. Since it would be illegal for the N.C. Department of Insurance to use Federal dollars earmarked for a specific purpose for any other purpose, the only explanation is that the Department is commingling Federal dollars with State dollars, which are earmarked for Departmental and/or MHB activities related to the promulgation and enforcement of the MHCSS.

With no clear statutory lines or agency rules defining the Commissioner's or the MHB's use of federal dollars, it would be impossible for the State to prove that MHB members do not receive compensation (prescribed in Article 9A), at least in part, from federal dollars.

The MHB is engaged in activities related to receiving and/or resolving complaints related to possible violations of the National MHCSS Act, and they are promulgating policy(s) or rule(s) related to the promulgation and enforcement of the MHCSS Act.

There is no question that Board members are acting in the capacity of "public officials" whenever they are engaged in "official acts" related to the promulgation and enforcement of the MHCSS. As such persons, and the terms or conditions of their appointment as "public officials" are irrelevant, they are subject to Title 18, USC §201.

This would as well, definitively make such Board members subject to the "Ethics in Government Act of 1978". There is only one means by which the State can remove the connection to these Federal Laws, which will be suggested towards the end of this discussion.

Given the direct statutory connection between the State Statute and the Federal Statute, it would capricious to believe that the MHB could segregate State activities from federally related activities.

[Article 9A §143.143-10] provides that "No member of the Board shall participate in any proceeding before the Board involving that member's own business". Precluding a member from receiving and resolving consumer complaints against self in no way deters or impedes self-dealing with other MHB Members, especially when any penalty or punishment that may deter such unlawful behavior has been obscured. Those members not precluded by this rule may also, or may have in the future, consumer complaints filed against them, where such precluded member would then be in a position to assist in bringing about a favorable outcome for them–Quid Pro Quo.

As stated in Article 9A, §143-143.10: only two members out of nine are prohibited from having a financial interest in the manufactured housing industry. Six of the nine MHB members are selected from the Manufactured Housing Industry, giving them; a decisive majority in all cases whatsoever, regardless of whether one member is precluded from participating in a proceeding regarding a consumer complaint against self. Given recent comments by the Insurance Commissioner's representative (on the record) regarding the composition of the MHB, it is unlikely the manufactured housing industry would not have a decisive majority even if a three quarters majority were required.

There is nothing about the statutory construction of this board that would convey to the public, that they could trust this Board to do anything that was not in the best financial interest of the Board member majority, and thereby, what was not in the best financial interest of the manufactured housing industry. At best, North Carolina has promulgated an ambiguous law; in regards to whether there are any statutory safeguards for assuring board members do not put their own interests ahead of the public health and welfare.

Perhaps the North Carolina Attorney General, the Attorney General, and the Governor were previously unaware of this Board's statutory construction. Perhaps now knowing this, the Governor and the Attorney General might jointly consider recommending to the N.C. Assembly, that in order to avoid the possibility of Federal meddling in the State's business, that the MHB's role should be changed to an advisory ONLY role (Emphasis added). In this manner, such board members would only advise government officials, who would be ultimately responsible for their policy decisions and enforcement decisions, or lack thereof, and who could be held fully accountable by the public for such decisions.

We plead with the North Carolina Attorney General to exercise his administrative authority and find that the Commissioner's policy or rule discussed herein impedes or impairs the full purposes and intent of the U.S. Congress, and therefore, it is statutorily unenforceable under Federal law, and therefore, cannot be enforced under any provision of State law.

We further plead with all N.C. elected officials to urge the Commissioner of Insurance to remove any language in regards to the Commissioner's policy discussed herein, from any form prescribed by the Department for receiving such consumer complaints. Without taking this appropriate measure, it is self-evident that the 'first purchasers' of this merchandise will continue to be misled by the Department into believing they do not have the right after 12-months from the date of delivery of their purchase, to be affirmatively heard by the Department on matters concerning standard-related problems.

Without this essential part of the process for affording the 'first purchaser(s)' their right under the MHCSS Act to timely and equitable remedy, the process simply has no beginning and without a beginning, the 'first purchaser's' right to due process is precluded.

Sincerely,

Vince and Linda Worthington
North Carolina Citizen Activists

Appendix A

24 CFR 3280.101 Scope

Subpart B states the planning requirements in manufactured homes.
The intent of this subpart is to assure the adequacy of architectural planning considerations, which assist in determining a safe and healthful environment.

3280.103 Light and ventilation.
3280.104 Ceiling heights.
3280.105 Exit facilities; exterior doors.
3280.106 Exit facilities; egress windows and devices.
3280.107 Interior privacy.
3280.108 Interior passage.
3280.109 Room requirements.
3280.110 Minimum room dimensions.
3280.111 Toilet compartments.
3280.112 Hallways.
3280.113 Glass and glazed openings.

24 CFR 3280.201 Scope

The purpose of this subpart is to set forth requirements that will assure reasonable fire safety to the occupants by reducing fire hazards and by providing measures for early detection.

3280.203 Flame spread limitations and fire protection
3280.204 Kitchen cabinet protection.
3280.205 Carpeting.
3280.206 Firestopping.
3280.207 Requirements for foam plastic thermal insulating
3280.208 Fire detection equipment.
3280.209 Fire testing.

24 CFR 3280.301Scope

This subpart covers the minimum requirements for materials, products, equipment and workmanship needed to assure that the manufactured home will provide:

1. Structural strength and rigidity,
2. Protection against corrosion, decay, insects and other similar destructive forces,
3. Protection against hazards of windstorm,
4. Resistance to the elements, and
5. Durability and economy of maintenance.

3280.305 Structural design requirements.
3280.306 Windstorm protection.
3280.307 Resistance to elements and use.
3280.308 Formaldehyde emission controls for certain wood products.
3280.309 Health Notice on formaldehyde emissions.
3280.401 Structural load tests.
3280.402 Test procedure for roof trusses.
3280.403 Standard for windows and sliding glass doors used in
3280.404 Standard for egress windows and devices for use in
3280.405 Standard for swinging exterior passage doors for use in
3280.406 Air chamber test method for certification and

24 CFR 3280.501 Scope

This subpart sets forth the requirements for condensation control, air infiltration, thermal insulation and certification for heating and comfort cooling.

3280.504 Condensation control and installation of vapor retarders.
3280.505 Air infiltration.
3280.506 Heat loss/heat gain.
3280.507 Comfort heat gain.
3280.508 Heat loss, heat gain and cooling load calculations.
3280.509 Criteria in absence of specific data.
3280.510 Heat loss certificate.
3280.511 Comfort cooling certificate and information.

24 CFR 3280.601 Scope

Subpart G of this standard covers the plumbing materials, fixtures, and equipment installed within or on manufactured homes. It is the intent of this subpart to assure water supply, drain, waste, and vent systems, which permit satisfactory functioning and provide for health and safety under all conditions of normal use.

3280.605 Joints and connections.
3280.606 Traps and cleanouts.
3280.607 Plumbing fixtures.
3280.608 Hangers and supports.
3280.609 Water distribution systems.
3280.610 Drainage systems.
3280.611 Vents and venting.
3280.612 Tests and inspection.

24 CFR 3280.701 Scope

Subpart H of this standard covers the heating, cooling and fuel burning equipment installed within, on, or external to a manufactured home.

3280.703 Minimum standards.
3280.704 Fuel supply systems.
3280.705 Gas piping systems.
3280.706 Oil piping systems.
3280.707 Heat producing appliances.
3280.708 Exhaust duct system and provisions for the future
3280.709 Installation of appliances.
3280.710 Venting, ventilation and combustion air.
3280.711 Instructions.
3280.712 Marking.
3280.713 Accessibility.
3280.714 Appliances, cooling.
3280.715 Circulating air systems.

24 CFR 3280.801 Scope

(a) Subpart I of this standard and part A of Article 550 of the National Electrical Code (NFPA No. 70-1993) cover the electrical conductors and equipment installed within or on manufactured homes and the conductors that connect manufactured homes to a supply of electricity.
(b) In addition to the requirements of this standard and Article 550 of the National Electrical Code (NFPA No. 70-1993) the applicable portions of other Articles of the National Electrical Code shall be followed covering electrical installations in manufactured homes.
Wherever the requirements of this standard differ from the National
Electrical Code, this standard shall apply.
(c) The provisions of this standard apply to manufactured homes intended for connection to a wiring system nominally rated 120/240volts, 3-wire AC, with grounded neutral.
(d) All electrical materials, devices, appliances, fittings and other equipment shall be listed or labeled by a nationally recognized testing agency and shall be connected in an approved manner when in service.
(e) Aluminum conductors, aluminum alloy conductors, and aluminum core conductors such as copper clad aluminum; are not acceptable for use in branch circuit wiring in manufactured homes.

3280.803 Power supply.
3280.804 Disconnecting means and branch-circuit protective
3280.805 Branch circuits required.
3280.806 Receptacle outlets.
3280.807 Fixtures and appliances.
3280.808 Wiring methods and materials.
3280.809 Grounding.
3280.810 Electrical testing.
3280.811 Calculations.
3280.812 Wiring of expandable units and dual units.
3280.813 Outdoor outlets, fixtures, air-conditioning equipment,
3280.814 Painting of wiring.
3280.815 Polarization.

Endnotes

¹  42 USC §5402(10) -''purchaser'' means the first person purchasing a manufactured home in good faith for purposes other than resale;

²  42 USC §5414(g)(1) - ...at each location where any such manufacturer's manufactured homes are offered for sale...

³  42 USC §5409(b)(1) - Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the sale, the offer for sale, or the introduction or delivery for introduction in interstate commerce of any manufactured home after the first purchase of it in good faith for purposes other than resale.

⁴  42 USC §5409(a) No person shall - (1) make use of any means of transportation or communication affecting interstate or foreign commerce or the mails to manufacture for sale, lease, sell, offer for sale or lease, or introduce or deliver, or import into the United States, any manufactured home which is manufactured on or after the effective date of any applicable Federal manufactured home construction and safety standard under this chapter and which does not comply with such standard, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, where such manufacture, lease, sale, offer for sale or lease, introduction, delivery, or importation affects commerce.

⁵  42 USC §5421- The rights afforded manufactured home purchasers under this chapter may not be waived, and any provision of a contract or agreement entered into after August 22, 1974, to the contrary shall be void.

⁶  42 USC §5414. Notification and correction of defects by manufacturer

⁷  42 USC §5415 - Every manufacturer of manufactured homes shall furnish to the distributor or dealer at the time of delivery of each such manufactured home produced by such manufacturer certification that such manufactured home conforms to all applicable Federal construction and safety standards. Such certification shall be in the form of a label or tag permanently affixed to each such manufactured home.

⁸  42 USC §5409(a)(4)- fail to issue a certification required by section 5415 of this title, or issue a certification to the effect that a manufactured home conforms to all applicable Federal manufactured home construction and safety standards, if such person in the exercise of due care has reason to know that such certification is false or misleading in a material respect.

⁹  42 USC 5409(a)(3)- fail to furnish notification of any defect as required by section 5414 of this title.

¹⁰ 42 USC 5414(a)- Every manufacturer of manufactured homes shall furnish notification of any defect in any manufactured home produced by such manufacturer, which he determines, in good faith, relates to a Federal manufactured home construction or safety standard or contains a defect, which constitutes an imminent safety hazard to the purchaser of such manufactured home...

¹¹ 42 USC 5402(5)- ''manufacturer'' means any person engaged in manufacturing or assembling manufactured homes...

¹² 42 USC §5402(2) - ''dealer'' means any person engaged in the sale, leasing, or distribution of new manufactured homes primarily to persons who in good faith purchase or lease a manufactured home for purposes other than resale; (4) - ''distributor'' means any person engaged in the sale and distribution of manufactured homes for resale.

¹³ The term "substantial" was deliberately excluded while transcribing §143-143.16 (1). The term "substantial" never appears in the MHCSS Act. In fact, the 93rd Congress with deliberateness, struck this very term from wherever it appeared in the legislation before enacting the MHCSS Act, making the use of this term in any regards, in connection with the MHCSS, arbitrary and capricious. While this was more than likely an unintentional oversight by the North Carolina Assembly, without any doubt, the use of this term has resulted in the unjust treatment of North Carolina Manufactured home purchasers, who have been denied remedy by their State government based on the use of a term that in every respect.