PART 3 -- THE AC PROCESS – RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT – NOT
The scope of the Secretary’s authority to conduct research and development is clearly laid out in 42 USCA §5407, and nowhere does it express or imply that he or the manufacturers of these products can sale nonconforming (statutorily illegal) experimental manufactured homes to the public, to furlough the cost of research and development.
Moreover, as implemented and practiced by the Secretary, the AC process fundamentally fails to make the grade as research and development.
For the objective of the AC process to be related to research and development, it must be related to the use of designs or techniques, which have never before been used in the manner in which they will be used, otherwise “new designs or techniques” (24 CFR 3282.14(a)) they are not.
To avoid a lengthy discussion on research and development, suffice to say for this discussion that a desired outcome is sought (expectations). Research, which includes component level testing, is conducted to aid in the development of a theoretical design for the new product. A prototype based on such new design is built or manufactured. The working prototype is then subjected to a test protocol developed specifically to insure that the new product will meet or exceed (performance) expectations (emphasis added). If it fails to perform to expectations, a failure analysis is conducted to determine the root cause of the failure [1], and the design is then revised based on such analysis. This process repeats until expectations are met, exceeded, or the technique or design proves impractical or unsuitable for the intended purpose, and is abandoned.
In the case of the AC process, the statutorily illegal AC manufactured home(s) represent the prototype(s) or the test platform for such new design(s) or technique(s). They simply cannot represent anything else; as expressed in his AC regulation, these designs or techniques are unproven; hence, the need to for the Alternative Construction letter. As stated, if previously used or incorporated in the same manner in any product before, then new design(s) and/or technique(s) they are not. At this point, beyond the manufacturer’s theoretical models or claims, the Secretary has no other proof or studies with which to conclude, or determine how these end-product prototype homes will perform, when they are subjected to real dead and live loads, and he does admit this reality. The absence of such studies or proof in itself does not defeat the purpose and intent of the MHCSS, but the absence of ongoing evaluation or study most certainly does.
Moreover, the absence of such studies subverts the quality assurance process, for quality-assurance cannot exist in any light, other than that of a folly, in the absence of legitimate product studies, which includes failure analysis of the product(s), or any part(s) thereof, which have failed when subjected to real world dead and live loads. It will be apparent later that such folly suffices to satisfy the Secretary’s requirement that such noncompliant manufactured homes are performing at least equivalent to “homes been built in compliance with the Standards.”
It is very important to understand that product improvement CANNOT occur in the absence of legitimate and continuous product studies/monitoring, which include good faith determinations of root cause failures. Restated, there is simply NO WAY of knowing where product improvement is needed in the absence of good faith studies, which include good faith determinations of root cause failure(s). The Secretary has willfully FAILED since the enactment of the MHCSS Act to collect data, as evidenced by the few contrived annual reports to Congress (42 USCA §5425) that he bothered to produce over the course of 24 years, to quantify improvement in the durability, quality, and safety of manufactured homes. Without such information, how does he or his manufacturers quantify in GOOD FAITH that the durability, quality, and safety of manufactured homes have improved (emphasis added)?
The Secretary’s claim that the public interest is not affected by his approval of the construction of upwards to hundreds of noncompliant prototypes per AC letter is at best, theoretical conjecture. Some in the scientific/engineering community may lightly refer to this kind of conjecture as a ‘SWAG’ or ‘Scientific Wild Ass Guess’. This does not mean that such AC approval is completely void of sound engineering, but in the absence of prototype study or monitoring and in the absence of failure analysis consistent with accepted engineering practices, the engineering process fails to retain its legitimacy [2].
This is the reason he uses the ambiguous term “believes,” which does not mean that it will prove to be true that such is providing “the same level of performance, quality, durability, and safety as would be provided under the Standards”; he just “believes” that it might. To validate his belief that such is providing “an equivalent level (Performance) of quality, durability, and safety to that provided by the Standards” the prototype must be subjected over time to objective review by Engineers and/or Building Code Officials. This is the reason that he strongly implies in his regulation that such monitoring or studies are being conducted under his process. As will be apparent later, the Secretary never did, nor does he intend to ever conduct such studies or evaluations of the manufactured homes that are built under his AC regulation.
If it turns out such new technique or design does not provide such, they (HUD and the Manufacturers) repel all efforts by the purchaser to obtain the remedy promised by the Secretary under his AC regulation (24 CFR 3282.14(d)). The reason for this will also be apparent later in the discussion.
In the absence of good faith studies, which includes failure analysis, the alleged ‘research and development’ purpose is eliminated as a legitimate reason for the issuance by the Secretary of any AC letter, which leaves only the first cause for issuance of an AC letter. As stated, “compliance with the Standards would be unreasonable because of the circumstances of the particular case,” or in the case of HUD’s AC letters, upwards to hundreds of noncompliant manufactured homes per particular case.
THERE IS NOTHING whatsoever in HUD’s regulations that explains what is encompassed or limits the “particular circumstance” that would make it “unreasonable” for the manufacturer, to produce a product that meets or exceeds all applicable performance based standards (emphasis added) or the MHCSS. This makes 24 CFR 3282.14(a)(3)(i) arbitrary and capricious in every respect.
1
Note:
Failure Analysis is not limited to pre-production release of a
product for public consumption. Failure analysis in any legitimate
quality assurance program would include evaluation of failures
during the normal use of such a product by the users. Hence, this is
the primary means of discovering latent defect(s), and evaluating
“the risk to” consumer “safety
reasonably related to such defect”(42 USCA §5414(c)).
Quality assurance is an integral part of legitimate risk management
programs. In the case of the manufacturers of manufactured housing,
risk is managed or masked with a government approval and not through
legitimate quality assurance programs.
2
It
is noteworthy to mention that if the Secretary’s AC process
was subjected to an ISO: 9000 audit to determine process compliance
that it is highly probable that his process would fail such an
audit; provided it was conducted without prior notice.